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BRUNO  : IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE
IN DE LA CAUSA, PRINCIPIO ET UNO , 
DIALOGUE II
Dilwyn Knox
Summary
The second dialogue of  De la causa, principio et uno focuses on the transcendence and 
immanence of  the intelligible world. Following Egyptian and Pythagorean doctrine, 
Bruno described the World Soul and Universal Intellect as immanent, blending in 
compatible features of  Neoplatonic ontology. The position that he attributed to these 
ancient theologians derived in fact from Stoic philosophy – hence his emphasis on 
immanence and his designation of  the World Soul, rather than a hypostasis Soul of  
the kind that ancient Neoplatonists had proposed, as intermediary between the Uni-
versal Intellect and physical reality. Bruno recognized, however, the limitations of  spa-
tial analogies when applied to intelligible realities. To clarify his position, he adopted 
a distinction, originally Neoplatonic and then Arabic, between cause and principle 
developed by Thomas Aquinas in De principiis naturae. The original purpose of  this 
doctrine had been to explain the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of  in-
telligible realities, the problem that Bruno was addressing in the second dialogue of  
De la causa.
Bruno gave his first detailed account of  the intelligible world, as far as his surviving works reveal, in the second dialogue of  De la causa, prin-
cipio et uno (1584). Here he explained the relationship of  God, the Universal 
Intellect, the World Soul and matter and, to this end, introduced the distinc-
tion between principle and cause which, as its title suggests, informs the 
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work as a whole. The position that he outlined may be taken as his consid-
ered view. Apart from some minor discrepancies, it conforms to what he 
wrote in works written before and after De la causa. In particular, it corre-
sponds with his comments in two later works, the Lampas triginta statuarum 
(1587) and Summa terminorum metaphysicorum (1591). 1 What distinguished his 
comments in De la causa was that only here did Bruno explain in detail how 
the components of  his intelligible world cohered.
The significance of  De la causa has long been recognized. In the ninth 
volume of  his Geschichte der Philosophie, published in 1814, Wilhelm Gottlieb 
Tennemann praised Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi for having provided excerpts 
from « Bruno’s most significant work, De la causa, principio et uno » and for 
« having lucidly conveyed the soul of  Bruno’s philosophy ». 2 Tennemann 
was referring here to Jacobi’s German paraphrase of  the four philosophical 
dialogues (ii-v) of  De la causa, with a long quotation from the second, pub-
lished as a supplement to his second edition of  Spinoza’s works, issued in 
1789. 3 Jacobi’s supplement inspired a revival of  Bruno’s fortunes as a philos-
opher, providing as it did the most accessible source for his ideas until Adolf  
Wagner’s edition of  Bruno’s Italian works, published in 1830, and August 
Friedrich Gfrörer’s edition of  the Latin ones of  1836. What disturbed Jacobi 
and fascinated F. W. J. Schelling, Hegel, Goethe, Schopenhauer, Coleridge, 
Wilhelm Dilthey and many others was Bruno’s purported pantheism, his 
‘Spinozism’. 4 Scholarly attention nowadays concentrates on other aspects 
of  Bruno’s life and works, yet his ontology, given its radical theological and 
philosophical implications, remains of  abiding interest and the key to un-
derstanding his thought as whole.
1 Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 38-61 ; bom 1008-1060 ; Summa term. met., bol i,iv 73-126.
2 W. G. Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols, Leipzig, 1798-1819, ix, p. 390 : « Der 
geistreiche Jacobi hat aus der Hauptschrift des Bruno : de la causa, principio ed uno und Buhle 
aus den übrigen ausführliche Auszüge gegeben und der erste besonders die Seele der Bruno-
ischen Philosophie deutlich entwickelt ». Later authors agreed that De la causa was Bruno’s 
major work ; see E. Canone, Introduzione, in Brunus redivivus. Momenti della fortuna di Giorda-
no Bruno nel xix secolo, ed. E. Canone, Pisa-Rome, 1998, pp. xx-xxi.
3 F.H. Jacobi, Beylage I. Auszug aus Jordan Bruno von Nola, Von der Ursache, dem Prinzip und 
dem Einen, in Idem, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelsohn, revised 
ed., Breslau, 1789, pp. 260-307. The Italian quotation ibidem, pp. 271-276, corresponds to Causa, 
ii, oib i 658-662 : « Mi par udir cosa molto nova [...] non dico di vantaggio ».
4 E. Canone, Introduzione, cit., pp. xiv, xvii-xxx, xliii  ; H. Gatti, Bruno nella cultura inglese 
dell’ Ottocento, in Brunus redivivus, cit., pp. 20-23, 29, 41-42 ; M. Rascaglia, Bruno nell’epistolario 
e nei manoscritti di Bertrando Spaventa, in Brunus redivivus, cit., pp. 106-107, 110-117 ; D. Giovan-
nozzi, Bruno nei manuali italiani di storia della filosofia del xix secolo, in Brunus redivivus, cit., pp. 
295, 300 304, 307 ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo dell’eterno. Percorsi della filosofia di Giordano Bru-
no, Pisa, 2003, pp. 29-30 ; T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, in bw iii cxiv-cxvi, cxx, cxxvii-cxli (but 
cfr. ibidem, p. clxvi for Cassirer’s less appreciative view) ; S. Ricci, Dal Brunus redivivus al 
Bruno degli italiani. Metamorfosi della nolana filosofia tra Sette e Ottocento, Rome, 2009, pp. 42-53.
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The present essay focuses on just the second dialogue of  De la causa, Bru-
no’s opening philosophical statement following the mise-en-scène in the 
first dialogue. It shows, it is hoped, how Bruno here set himself  the task of  
explaining in what sense the World Soul and Universal Intellect could be 
said to be immanent or transcendent ; and it identifies the principal sources, 
some of  them unnoticed but revealing, that he adapted to this end. It does 
not, needless to say, pretend to be a comprehensive account of  Bruno’s on-
tology in De la causa, let alone his works as a whole. It will have served its 
purpose if  it clarifies Bruno’s opening move in his challenge to received wis-
dom concerning the intelligible realm.
The World Soul and the Universal Intellect
The focus of  the second dialogue of  De la causa, as Bruno himself  men-
tioned, was the World Soul – or more accurately, given that it animated 
a universe rather than a cosmos, the Soul of  the Universe or Universal 
Soul. 1 His comments are in keeping with what he wrote elsewhere. 2 The 
universe was an animate whole, an infinite ‘organism’, informed by the 
World Soul. 3 Its principal bodies – the ‘suns’, ‘earths’, comets and other 
bodies – moving in its infinite expanse were ‘great animals’ (grandi ani-
mali, principali animali), each of  which, like our earth, nurtured animals, 
1 Causa, proemiale epistola, oib i 600 : « nel primo [or rather : ‘secondo’] [dialogo] è discor-
so circa la forma [scil., la anima] ».
2 For the World, or Universal, Soul in Bruno’s works, see, e.g., F. Tocco, Le opere inedite 
di Giordano Bruno, Naples, 1891, pp. 65-75 ; E. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu dans la philosophie de 
Giordano Bruno, Paris, 1926, pp. 17-62 ; L. Cicuttini, Giordano Bruno, Milan, [1950], pp. 145-169 ; 
P.-H. Michel, Renaissance Cosmologies : I ‘Natura artifex’ : Marsilio Ficino and Giordano Bruno. 
ii The Reign of  Unity : Bruno and Campanella, « Diogenes », xviii, 1957, pp. 94-95 ; Idem, La Cos-
mologie de Giordano Bruno, Paris, 1962, pp. 113-132 (English trans. : The Cosmology of  Giordano 
Bruno, trans. R.E.W. Maddison, London, 1973, pp. 108-125) ; H. Védrine, La Conception de 
la nature chez Giordano Bruno, Paris, 1967, pp. 281-288 ; G. Aquilecchia, Introduzione, in G. 
Bruno, De la causa, principio et uno, ed. G. Aquilecchia, Turin, 1973, pp. xxx, xxxiv-xxxvi  ; W. 
Beierwaltes, Einleitung, in G. Bruno, Von der Ursache, dem Prinzip und dem Einen, trans. A. 
Lasson, notes by P. R. Blum, Hamburg, 1977, pp. xiv-xix  ; L. Spruit, Il problema della conoscen-
za in Giordano Bruno, Naples, 1988, pp. 144, 185-205, 319 ; Idem, ‘Spiritus mundi’. Censura eccle-
siastica e psicologia rinascimentale a proposito di un documento inedito dall’Archivio del Sant’Uffizio 
romano, in F. Meroi (ed.), La mente di Giordano Bruno, Florence, 2004, pp. 259-288, especially, 
pp. 266-269 ; T. Dagron, Unité de l’être et dialectique. L’idée de philosophie naturelle chez Gior-
dano Bruno, Paris, 1999, pp. 244-245 ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, cit., pp. 7-8, 14-15, 57-60, 
65-66, 85, 100-102, 119 note 227, 129, 136-141, 163-179, 200-201, 209-233, 239-240 ; Idem, Magia dei 
contrari. Cinque studi su Giordano Bruno, Rome, 2005, pp. 13-17 ; T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., 
in bw iii 340-341.
3 Causa, proemiale epistola, ii, iv, oib i 598-599, 656-663, 668-670, 717. Similarly, Lampas trig. 
stat., bol iii 56-59, bom 1048-1054 ; De immenso, iv.9, bol i,ii 51 : « Spiritus inde simul totum 
contemprat unus, / Unicus ille animus cunctis, Iovis omnia plena ».
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plants and other living things. 1 Apparently inanimate objects, even stones, 
had some vestige of  life, a ‘vital principle’ (principio vitale) within them. 2 
Evidence of  this was the use to which necromancers put the bones of  the 
dead, 3 as were the powers of  gemstones that could not be reduced to el-
emental properties. 4
The Platonic or Neoplatonic cast of  these ideas may seem, as it has to 
many Bruno scholars, self-evident. 5 Felice Tocco, for example, referred to, 
and quoted extensively from, De la causa, book ii, in support of  this interpre-
tation. 6 Bruno, of  course, recognized that the World Soul was an essential 
feature of  Plato’s and Platonic cosmology. In the second dialogue of  De la 
causa, he cited passages in the Timaeus, 7 the work in which Plato expounded 
his views on the subject. 8 Elsewhere, too, Bruno borrowed ideas from Pla-
tonic accounts of  the World Soul in sources translated by Marsilio Ficino, as 
well as accounts in Ficino’s own works. 9 For Bruno, however, the doctrine 
was not Plato’s invention, nor was it quintessentially Platonic. Rather, it was 
Pythagorean, 10 an attribution mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, Lactantius 
and other sources. 11 Indeed the author of  the doctrine, in Bruno’s mind, 
was even more venerable than Pythagoras, a point that Bruno scholarship 
seems to have overlooked. In the Pimander and Asclepius, the Egyptian sage 
 1 Causa, ii, oib i 649, 659-662. Similarly, Cena, iii, oib i 511-513 ; Infinito, iii, oib ii 102 ; De 
immenso, v.9, v.12, bol i,ii 146-147, 157-159. Plato had described the cosmos as an animal ; see 
Plato, Timaeus, 30b7-31b4, and for Ficino’s translation animal, see Plato, [Opera], in Ficino’s 
Latin translation, with his commentaries, summaries and other matter related to Plato and 
the Platonic corpus, 2 vols, Florence, 1484-85, ii, sig. et4ra-rb. 
 2 Causa, ii, oib i 658-662. Similarly, De immenso, v.9, v.12, bol i,ii 146-147, 158-160 ; Summa 
term. met., bol i,iv 107 ; and Plotinus, iv.4.3616-21.
 3 Causa, ii, oib i 662. Similarly, see De vinculis, bol iii 672 ; De minimo, ii.6, bol i,iii 210 ; De 
monade, vi, bol i,ii 418 ; De magia, bol iii 398-399 ; F. Tocco, Le opere inedite, cit., p. 209. For 
the use of  bones in necromancy, see Lucan, Pharsalia, vi.533-534, 586 ; Cornelius Agrippa 
von Nettesheim, De occulta philosophia libri tres, ed. V. Perrone Compagni, Leiden, 1992, p. 
536 (iii.42) ; R. Kieckhefer, Forbidden Rites. A Necromancer’s Manual of  the Fifteenth Century, 
Stroud (Gloucestershire), 1997, pp. 89-91, 113 ; G. Luck, Arcana Mundi. Magic and the Occult in 
the Greek and Roman Worlds. A Collection of  Ancient Texts, 2nd ed., Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006, pp. 57, 60, 210.
 4 Causa, ii, oib i 662. Similarly, Sig. sigill., i.31, bol ii,ii 174, bomne ii 214 ; De immenso, vi.12, 
bol i,ii 159-160 ; Summa term. met., bol i,iv 107.
 5 L. Cicuttini, Giordano Bruno, cit., p. 145 ; É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 17-62 ; L. 
Spruit, Il problema della conoscenza, cit., pp. 189, 193.
 6 F. Tocco, Le opere latine, cit., pp. 339-342.  7 Causa, ii, oib i 649, 658.
 8 Plato, Timaeus, 30b3-31b5, 34b3-37c10.
 9 D. Knox, Ficino, Copernicus and Bruno on the Motion of  the Earth, « Bruniana & Campanel-
liana », v, 1999, pp. 333-363, at pp. 334-353.
10 In addition to the passages cited on p. 468, note 7 below, see Causa, proemiale epistola, 
boi i, 599 ; Camoer. acrot., bol i,i 65, 177 ; De magia math., xii, bol iii 497, bom 22.
11 Diogenes Laertius viii.28 ; Lactantius, Divine Institutes, i.5 (pl vi 134a) ; J. Moreau, 
L’âme du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens, Paris, 1939, pp. 145-157.
1_Impaginato1_bz4.indd   466 26-11-2013   14:31:08
467bruno: de la causa, principio et uno, dialogue ii
Hermes Trismegistos had described the cosmos as a living thing, animated 
throughout, 1 and, on three occasions in the Pimander, following Ficino’s 
Latin translation, he had called the cosmic principle of  animation the anima 
mundi or mundi totius anima. 2 That Bruno was familiar with these works, 
flawed though Frances Yates’s ‘Hermetic’ interpretation of  his thought may 
be, is undeniable. 3
Bruno’s source, direct or indirect, for this historical account was chiefly 
Ficino’s interpretation of  the prisca theologia, the gentile tradition of  learn-
ing which, originating with sages like Hermes, had inspired Plato’s phi-
losophy. However, Bruno, true to character, inverted the moral that Fici-
no had intended to convey. For Ficino, Platonic philosophy, including the 
doctrine of  the World Soul, explained the full philosophical significance of  
what Hermes and other earlier thinkers had revealed, just as, following a 
traditional train of  thought, Christianity had brought out the true mean-
ing of  Old Testament lore. For Bruno, by contrast, Plato’s philosophy and 
Platonism generally marked a degeneration of  the truths known to ancient 
sages. Human knowledge, like all things in or associated with the physi-
cal universe, observed the rule of  vicissitude, oscillating from one extreme 
to the other over the course of  time. Platonism did not mark the nadir of  
philosophy. That accolade belonged to Aristotelianism and its scholastic 
derivatives. It stood instead, we might say, midway between the extremes. 
Despite its imperfections, it preserved substantial traces of  the truth, ones 
1 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], x.7, x.15, xi.4, xi.8, xi.14, xii.15-21, CH i 116.7-8, 120.17-
18, 148.20-149.2, 150.14-17, 152.26-153.4, 180.7-182.16 ; Idem, Asclepius, §§6, 14, 29-30, ch, ii 303, 
313, 337-338. For an English translation and commentary, see B. P. Copenhaver, Hermetica. 
The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a new English translation, trans. into 
English, with an introduction and notes, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 31, 33, 38, 39, 40, 46-47, 70, 75, 85, 
158. For the above passages from the Pimander in Ficino’s Latin translation, see, respectively, 
Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], trans. M. Ficino, Treviso, 1471, fols [32r, 34r, 38r, 39r, 40v-
41r, 47v-48v]. 
2 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], x.7, x.15, xi.4, ch i 116.7-8, 120.17-18, 148.20, trans. Fi-
cino, fols 32r : « ab una mundi totius anima », 34r : « mundi totius anima », 38r : « anima mundi ».
3 E.g. : 1) Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], i.4, ch i. 8.1-3, cited in De immenso, iii.8, bol 
i,i 376 ; 2) Pimander, i.4-6, 20, iii.1, ch i 8.1-2, 8.7, 8.16, 13.24, 44.8, cited in De monade, 11, bol i,ii 
463 ; 3) Pimander, xii.8, ch i 177.4-5, trans. Ficino, fol. [45r] : « pr[i]m[o]genitus deus », cited in ( ?) 
De minimo, i.9, bol i,iii 171 ; 4) Pimander, xii.1, ch i 174.7, cited ( ?) in De immenso, iv.7, bol i,ii 
33, 39 ; 5) Pimander, xii, ch i 177.4, cited in De minimo, i.9, bol i,iii 171 ; 6) Asclepius, 24-26, ch ii 
326.10-331.4, cited, or alluded to, in De umbris, bol ii,i 9 ; Spaccio, iii.2, oib ii 363-365 ; Furori, ii.1, 
oib ii 645 ; 7) Asclepius, 6, ch ii 301.18-302.2, cited in De immenso, i.1, bol i,i 206 ; De imag. comp., 
iii.10, bol ii,iii 306. Some of  these passages are discussed in : F.A. Yates, Giordano Bruno and 
the Hermetic Tradition, London, 1964, pp. 194-195, 211-215, 246, 267, 279 ; A. Ingegno, Ermetismo 
e oroscopo delle religioni nello Spaccio bruniano, « Rinascimento », 2nd series, vii, 1967, pp. 157-174 ; 
M. Ciliberto, La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno, Rome, 1986, pp. 157-171 ; 
H. Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science, Ithaca, 1999, pp. 13-17 ; E. Canone, Il dorso 
e il grembo, cit., p. 230.
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recognizable to those versed in ancient Egyptian lore. 1 Bruno’s interpreta-
tion of  the World Soul exemplified this stance. He was presenting, not a 
Platonic, let alone a Ficinian, interpretation, but the authentic Pythagorean 
or rather Egyptian version, elaborated, necessarily, given the paucity of  an-
cient Egyptian and Pythagorean records, with the help of  vestiges of  truth 
preserved by later philosophers, Platonists included, and indeed in Scripture 
too. Similar observations could be made about Bruno’s treatment of  related 
themes in the Pimander and Asclepius, for example, the unity of  all things, 
the eternity of  the World, as well as ideas mentioned below. 2
The feature of  the World Soul that Bruno emphasized in the second dia-
logue of  De la causa, as elsewhere, was its immanence. 3 He quoted Virgil’s 
celebrated lines in the Aeneid, book vi, to this effect. 4 The sublunary and 
superlunary regions, wrote Virgil, were animated from within : « the spiritus 
within nourishes the heavens, the earth, the flowing plains, the moon’s shin-
ing globe, and Titan’s star [the sun] ». 5 John Scot Eriugena, Thierry of  Char-
tres, Giovanni Dominici, Cardinal Bessarion and countless other medieval 
and Renaissance authors had maintained that Virgil’s lines drew on Platonic 
doctrine. 6 Bruno traced Virgil’s source back to the Pythagoreans. 7 The Ti-
maeus supported both misattributions. In Plato’s dialogue, the doctrine of  
1 E.g., Summa term. met., bol i,iv 102 : « Vulgata est comparatio apud Platonicos ex Aegyp-
tiorum disciplina », referring to the analogy of  the sun, sunlight and the warmth used to de-
scribe the triadic nature of  divine simplicity.
2 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], xii.8, ch i 177.5-7, trans. Ficino, fol. [45r].
3 Causa, ii, oib i 651-670 ; Spaccio, epistola esplicatoria, oib ii 182 ; De immenso, viii.10, bol 
i,ii 313 ; P.-H. Michel, La Cosmologie, cit., pp. 118-121 (The Cosmology, cit., pp. 113-115).
4 Causa, ii, oib i 652-654, 663 ; De magia math., xii, bol iii, p. 497 ; De magia, bol iii 434, bom 
242 ; boeuc, Documents, i, Le Procès, ed. and intro. L. Firpo, French trans. and notes A.-Ph. 
Segonds, Paris, 2000, pp. 71, 265. See also Sig. sigill., i.31, bol ii,ii 174, bomne ii 212 : « Mens 
enim, quae universi molem exagitat » ; Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 60, bom 1058 (apparatus).
5 Virgil, Aeneid, vi.724-726 : « Principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis, / lucentem-
que globum lunae Titaniaque astra/ spiritus intus alit, […] ».
6 P. Courcelle, Interprétations néoplatonisantes du livre vi de l’Énéide, in Recherches sur la 
tradition platonicienne, Entretiens sur l’antiquité classique, Fondation Hardt, vol. 3, Vandoeuvres, 
1955, p. 121 ; Idem, Connais-toi toi-même : de Socrate à saint Bernard, 3 vols, Paris, 1974-75, ii, pp. 
469-477 ; John Scot Eriugena, De divisione naturae, i.31, pl cxxii 476c  ; G. Dominici, O.P., 
Lucula noctis, ed. E. Hunt, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1940, pp. 12, 28 ; B. Bessarion, In calumniato-
rem Platonis libri iv, in L. Mohler, Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann, 3 
vols, Paderborn, 1923-1942, vol. ii (1927), p. 299 ; M. Ficino, Opera… omnia, 2 vols continuously 
paginated, Basel, 1576, pp. 614, 1597.
7 Camoer. acrot., art. 65, bol i, i 177 ; Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 60, bom 1058 ; De magia, ‘De 
analogia spirituum’, bol iii 434, bom 240 ; Firpo, Le Procès, pp. 71, 265 ; M. A. Granada, Gio-
rdano Bruno et la Stoa. Une présence non reconnue de thèmes stoïciens ?, in Le Stoïcisme au xvie et 
au xviie siècle. Le retour des philosophies antiques à l’âge classique, ed. P. F. Moreau, vol. i, Paris, 
1999, pp. 143-144 ; Idem, in boeuc, vii 509. Elsewhere, without reference to the doctrine of  the 
World Soul, Bruno speaks of  Virgil as a Pythagorean poet ; see Furori, arg. 5, i.2, oib ii 511, 
543, De immenso, iii.8, bol i,i 376.
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the World Soul was expounded by a speaker, Timaeus of  Locri, who tra-
ditionally, though unwarrantedly, was deemed a Pythagorean. Bruno fol-
lowed this designation. 1 A comment by Ficino that Virgil’s lines had been 
inspired by « the ancient theologians » may have further encouraged Bruno 
to describe them as Pythagorean in import. 2 We can probably assume that 
he also knew that Hermes had described the World Soul as immanent. The 
Asclepius recorded that « the spiritus with which all things are full, mingled 
with all things, vivifies all things » and that « it is associated with the mate-
rial world or rather it is within the material world ». 3 Here, as elsewhere in 
Hermes’s writings and sometimes in Bruno’s too, spiritus designated the 
World Soul. 4
Immanence also characterized Bruno’s concept of  what he called vari-
ously the Universal Intellect, the Universal Intelligence or Mind. The Uni-
versal Intellect, he wrote in dialogue ii of  De la causa, was the most intimate 
and characteristic faculty (facoltà) of  the World Soul. 5 The former, that is, 
was a power of  the latter, in the same way as intellect was a power of  the 
human soul. This interpretation excluded the view that it was a transcen-
dent hypostasis, distinct from the World Soul and hence from the sensible 
world too along the lines that Neoplatonists had typically imagined. 6 It was 
an « internal artificer » (artefice interno) or « artist intellect » (artifice intelletto), 
1 Causa, iii, oib i 683 : « Timeo pitagorico » ; T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw iii 394, 
note 72. 2 M. Ficino, Opera, p. 984.
3 Hermes Trismegistos, Asclepius, §§6, 14, ch ii 303 : « spiritus, quo plena sunt omnia, 
permixtus cunctis cuncta vivificat », 313 : « et mundo comitabatur spiritus vel inerat mundo 
spiritus » (English trans., B.P. Copenhaver, Hermetica, cit., pp. 70, 75). Festugière and Copen-
haver translate mundus in Asclepius, §14, as « matière » and « matter » respectively in keeping 
with Hermes’s preceding statement that mundus is his translation for u{lh. See also A.-J. Fes-
tugière and A. D. Nock in ch ii 370, notes 124-125.
4 For Bruno’s use of  spiritus to designate the World or Universal Soul, see, e.g., Lampas trig. 
stat., bol iii 50, bom 1038 : « spiritus universalis seu animae mundi » ; De immenso, iv.9, bol i,ii 
51 : « Spiritus inde simul totum contemperat unus,/ Unicus ille animus cunctis, Iovis omnia 
plena » ; and D. Giovannozzi, Spiritus Mundus quidam. Il concetto di spirito nell’opera di Giorda-
no Bruno, Rome, 2006, pp. 73-80, 184, 224-227.
5 Causa ii, oib i 651-653. See also : Cabala, ii.1, oib ii 454-456 ; F. Fiorentino, Il panteismo di 
Giordano Bruno, Naples, 1861 (reprint : Naples, 2008), pp. 55-57 ; H. Védrine, La Conception de 
la nature, cit., p. 140 ; É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 49, 55, 112 ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il 
grembo, cit., pp. 101-102 ; T. Dagron, Unité de l’être, cit., pp. 245, 249-250.
6 As noted by É. Namer, La Philosophie de Bruno, in G. Bruno, Cause, principe et unité, 
French trans. and notes É. Namer, Paris, 1930, p. 17 ; Idem, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 49-50 ; 
P.-H. Michel, La Cosmologie, cit., pp. 116-117, 119 (The Cosmology, cit., pp. 110-112, 114) ; M. A. 
Granada, Giordano Bruno et la Stoa, cit., p. 149 ; T. Dagron, Unité de l’être et dialectique, cit., p. 
245 ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, cit., p. 65. Bruno mentioned that Platonists held that the 
Intellect was a transcendental reality ; see Causa, ii, oib i 652-653 : « Questo fabro [del mondo], 
dicono [viz. i Platonici], procede dal mondo superiore (il quale è a fatto uno) a questo mondo 
sensibile che è diviso in molti ». 
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because « it forms matter, shaping it from within ». 1 The description of  the 
(Universal) Intellect as a craftsman, as Bruno noted himself, was Platonic. 2 
It derived from Plato’s description of  the Demiurge in the Timaeus (28c), 
whom Plotinus for one had sometimes identified with his second hypos-
tasis, Intellect or nous. 3 The qualification ‘internal’, however, was Bruno’s 
addition, inserted to reinforce the notion that the Intellect was immanent. 
By contrast, the Platonic Demiurge, as he remarked, proceeded « from the 
superior realm, which is wholly one ». 4 Many other comments in the second 
dialogue of  De la causa served the same purpose. From within seeds and se-
men, Bruno tells us, the Universal Intellect fashioned the physical attributes 
of  plants and animals, moving out circularly from inside and then, as death 
approached, circling back in again. 5 Virgil confirmed that the Universal In-
tellect was immanent immediately after his account of  the spiritus quoted 
above : « the Mind (mens), spread through the sinews [of  the cosmos], stirs 
the entire mass, mingling with its whole body ». 6 Again, Hermes, as Bruno 
no doubt knew, even if  he did not trouble to say so, had described the Mind 
(Mens in Ficino’s Latin translation) as within the cosmic soul, vivifying the 
cosmos and the things of  which it was constituted. 7
1 Causa, ii, oib i 653-654. Similarly, Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 49, 52, bom 1036 : « Est enim [in-
tellectus] artifexqui non circa materiam, sed intra omnem materiam et naturam operatur », 
1042 : « Mundi faber intelligitur, intrinsecus agens, et fabrefaciens, et architectum ordinans et 
conservans ». See also T. Dagron, Unité de l’être, cit., pp. 247-248.
2 Causa, ii, oib i 652. For Bruno’s use of  the craftsman analogy, see T. Dagron, Unité de 
l’être et dialectique, cit., pp. 245-265.
3 E.g., Plotinus, ii.3.1815 ; v.1.84-7 ; v.9.3.26 ; J.-M. Charrue, Plotin, Lecteur de Platon, Paris, 
1978, pp. 124-139 ; M. Andolfo, L’ipostasi della ‘Psyche’ in Plotino. Struttura e fondamenti, Milan, 
1996, pp. 237-241. Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], x.18, ch, i, p. 122.7-9, spoke of  the Intel-
lect as a dhmiourgov~. 4 Causa, ii, oib i 652-653.
5 Causa, ii, oib i 653-654. Similarly, Spaccio, epistola esplicatoria, oib ii 181-182 ; Sig. sigill., 
i.31, ii.3, bol ii,ii 174, 196, bomne ii 212-214, 258 ; De minimo, i, bol i,iii 143. This was an ap-
plication of  Bruno’s principle that vital forces moved outwards from a centre and then, with 
the approach of  death, returned back again ; see W. Pagel, Giordano Bruno : the Philosophy of  
Circles and the Circular Movement of  the Blood, « Journal of  the History of  Medicine and Allied 
Sciences », vi, 1951, pp. 116-124, at pp. 120-121.
6 Virgil, Aeneid, vi.726-727 : « […] totamque infusa per artus/ mens agitat molem et mag-
no se corpore miscet ». Bruno replaced ‘magno’ with ‘toto’ or ‘totque’ when quoting these 
lines, an alteration that suited his argument that the World Soul was ‘all-in-all’ (see p. 472 be-
low) ; see Causa, ii, bol i 663 ; De magia, ‘De analogia spirituum’, bol iii 434, bom 240.
7 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], xi.4, ch, i 148.21-149.2, B. P. Copenhaver, Hermetica, 
cit., p. 38, trans. Ficino, fol. [38r] : « Deus in mente, mens in anima, anima autem in materia, 
omnia vero ista per aevum. Totum hoc corpus, in quo corpora omnia, anima mente, deoque 
plena, intima mundi replet, complectitur extima. Vitam omnibus haec sugeret [suggerit], 
extrinsecus quidem ingenti huic perfectoque animali mundi, intrinsecus autem caeteris quae 
insunt mundo viventibus, supraque in coelo, quod idem est, omnia sistens, infra vero in terra 
generationem agitans ». Similarly Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], xii.13-14, ch i 179.13-21, 
trans. Ficino, fol. [46v]. 
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An important corollary of  Bruno’s interpretation was the elimination 
of  the Neoplatonic hypostasis Soul. 1 For Plotinus, Proclus and other an-
cient Neoplatonists, the World Soul and individual human souls were in-
stantiations of  the transcendent reality, Soul, dependent on the Intellect. 2 
On one occasion, Bruno mentioned this Platonic position, seemingly with 
approval. 3 Yet his comments in De la causa and other works, suggest that, 
for Bruno, souls were instead instantiations of  the immanent World Soul. 4 
The latter, he wrote in De l’infinito and De immenso, was the ‘soul of  souls’. 5 
His World Soul, in short, usurped the role of  the Neoplatonic Soul with 
respect to individual souls. One indication of  this is the analogy that Bruno 
used at the conclusion of  the second dialogue of  De la causa to illustrate the 
doctrine of  « all-in-all ». 6 The World Soul, he wrote, was « all-in-all », that is, 
1 É. Namer, La Philosophie de Giordano Bruno, cit., pp. 17, 38-40, ignores this point.
2 E.g., Plotinus, ii.3[52].13 ; iv.3 [27].1-8 ; v.1[10].2 ; vi.2 [43].20. For discussion of  the Neo-
platonic relationship of  individual souls to the World Soul, see, e.g., P. Merlan, Plotinus En-
neads 2.2, « Transactions and Proceedings of  the American Philological Association », lxxiv, 
1943, pp. 179-191, at p. 190 ; H. J. Blumenthal, Soul, World-Soul, and Individual Soul in Plotinus, 
in Le Néoplatonisme, Colloques internationaux du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 
Paris, 1971, pp. 55-63 ; J. M. Rist, Plotinus’ Psychology. His Doctrines of  the Embodied Soul, The 
Hague, 1971, pp. 14-15, 27-30 ; A. Graeser, Plotinus and the Stoics. A Preliminary Study, Leiden, 
1972, pp. 30-31 ; M. Andolfo, L’ipostasi, cit., pp. 38-42, and passim.
3 Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 58-59, bom 1054 : « Ita universum hoc animal reducitur ad unum 
principium ideale, sicut et particularia animalia. Ab eadem enim idea intelligunt esse animam 
mundi et aliorum animam, unde non credunt platonici animam particularium animalium 
esse partem animae universi, utpote impartibilis. Nobis vero in praesentiarum est dubium, 
quamvis magis ad hanc quam ad illam partem inclinemus ».
4 Causa, v, oib i 731-733 ; Spaccio, epistola esplicatoria, oib ii 181-182 ; Cabala, ii.1, oib ii 452-
457 ; Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 56-60, 182-183, bom 1050-1058, 1314-1316 ; De minimo, i.3, ii.6, bol i, 
iii 143, 209-210 ; Thes. de magia, xi, bol iii 463, bom 340 ; De magia, bol iii 408-409, 435, bom 186-
188, 242 ; Firpo, Le Procès, cit., p. 383. These passages conflict with the passage in the Lampas 
triginta statuarum quoted in the note above, where Bruno says that he inclined to the Platonic 
view that individual souls and the World Soul alike depended on (the hypostasis) Soul and 
that therefore they were not parts of  the World Soul. At one moment during his trial (Firpo, 
Le Procès, cit., p. 387), Bruno claimed that, unlike the souls of  brutes, human souls did not 
return to ‘l’università del spirito’ after bodily death. Was this, however, a tactical concession ? 
For discussions of  this crux in Bruno’s philosophy, see e.g., F. Tocco, Le opere inedite, cit., pp. 
vii, 65-75 ; Idem, Le opere latine, cit., pp. 387-391 ; R. Mondolfo, La filosofia di Giordano Bruno e la 
interpretazione di Felice Tocco, « Cultura filosofica », v, 1912, pp. 25-33 (qualifying Tocco) ; G. Gen-
tile, Giordano Bruno e il pensiero del Rinascimento, Florence, 1920, pp. 75-83 (disagreeing with 
Tocco and Mondolfo) ; É. Namer, La Philosophie de Giordano Bruno, cit., pp. 17-19 ; Idem, Les 
Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 37-47, 146 ; L. Cicuttini, Giordano Bruno, cit., pp. 153-159 ; H. Védrine, 
La Conception de la nature, cit., pp. 299-307 ; P.-H. Michel, La Cosmologie, cit., pp. 118-123 (The 
Cosmology, cit., pp. 113-118) ; L. Spruit, Il problema della conoscenza, cit., pp. 198-201 ; T. Dagron, 
Unité de l’être et dialectique, cit., pp. 280-290, E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, cit., pp. 11, 56-59, 
68-71, 100-101, 166-167, 191-192, 223-226. 
5 Infinito, i, oib ii, p. 55 ; De immenso, vii.8, bol i, ii, 259. 
6 Bruno frequently applies the doctrine of  ‘all-in-all’ to describe the World Soul’s pres-
ence in things ; see, in addition to the sources on p. 472, note 1 below, e.g., Causa, proemiale 
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present wholly and indivisibly in each and every thing, just as the sound of  a 
single voice could be present throughout a room and hence wholly audible 
to everyone in it, however great the audience.  1 Indeed, if  the sound of  a 
single voice could carry throughout the whole universe, it would be « all-in-
all ». 2 The analogy derived from Plotinus, who had used it, in a more sophis-
ticated form and without allusion, needless to say, to an infinite universe, to 
explain how the hypostasis Soul – rather than the World Soul – was wholly 
present in all things capable of  receiving it. 3
The World Soul and the Universal Intellect that Bruno described in the 
second book of  De la causa were not, then, authentically Platonic, despite 
the numerous borrowings from Plato, Plotinus, Ficino and other Platonists. 
The Universal Intellect was not a transcendental reality or hypostasis pro-
ducing a subordinate but similarly transcendent reality, Soul, of  which the 
World Soul and individual human souls were instantiations. Instead, Bru-
no’s Universal Intellect was a faculty intrinsic to the World Soul immanent 
within all things, whereas individual souls were ‘parts’ of  the World Soul. In 
these respects, Bruno’s ontology is not so much Platonic as Stoic, as Émile 
Namer observed. 4 The resemblance is not fortuitous. For Bruno, the doc-
trine of  the World Soul was, as mentioned above (pp. 466-467), Pythagorean 
or Egyptian and the two most important testimonies to this effect were 
epistola, ii, iv, v, oib i 600, 606, 659, 661-662, 717, 730-732 ; Infinito, i, oib ii 55 ; Cabala, epist, oib 
ii 413 ; Sig. sigill., ii.3, bol ii,ii 196, bomne ii 258-260 ; De immenso, vii.8, vii.18, bol i, ii 261, 
284 ; De minimo, ii.6, bol i,iii 209 ; De magia, bol iii 434-435, bom 240-242 ; Firpo, Le Procès, 
cit., pp. 67, 303. Following Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, ii.5, in Idem, Opera omnia, 
vol. 1-, Leipzig, 1932-, i, p. 76, and M. Ficino, Opera, cit., p. 1768, Bruno (Causa, ii, oib i 661) 
attributed the doctrine of  « all-in-all » to Anaxagoras. For discussion of  Bruno’s application of  
this doctrine, see F. Tocco, Le opere inedite, cit., p. 52 ; É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 
35-37, 98 ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, cit., pp. 61, 63, 71, 175, 214. Scholastic authors applied 
the doctrine to the soul’s presence in the body, as Segonds notes in Firpo, Le Procès, cit., p. 
552, note 9, citing Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis, lib. 1, dist. 8, qu. 5, art. 3, co. 
For its ancient Neoplatonic use, see R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism, second ed., London, 1995 
(first ed., 1972), pp. 54-55.
1 Causa, ii, oib i 669-670. Similarly De immenso, iv.15, bol i,ii 85 ; De monade, x, bol i,ii 457 ; 
Thes. de magia, 9, bol iii 460-461, bom 334-336 ; Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 56-57, bom 1052-1052 ; 
Firpo, Le Procès, cit., p. 387.  2 Causa, ii, oib i 669-670.
3 Plotinus, vi.iv.121-50.
4 Diogenes Laertius, vii.138-139 (svf ii.634), vii.142 (svf ii.633) ; É. Namer, Les As-
pects de Dieu, cit., pp. 52-55, 88. For Mind, pneuma and the World Soul in Stoic philosophy, 
see A. S. Pease’s notes in Cicero, De natura deorum libri III, ed. and comm. A. S. Pease, 2 
vols, Cambridge, Mass, 1955-58, ii, pp. 257-258, 267-268 ; D. E. Hahm, The Origins of  Stoic 
Cosmology, [Columbus, OH], 1977, pp. 136-184 ; M. Lapidge, Archai and Stoicheia : a Problem 
in Stoic Cosmology, « Phronesis », xviii, 1973, pp. 273-278 ; Idem, Stoic Cosmology, in The Stoics, 
ed. J. M. Rist, Berkeley, 1978, pp. 163-185 ; G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence. Stoic 
and Platonist Readings of  Plato’s Timaeus, Turnhout, 1999, pp. 43, 51-61, 66-73, 97-99, 122, 129 
note 38.
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Virgil and Hermes Trismegistos. Contrary to what Bruno believed, how-
ever, both were in fact Stoic in inspiration. 1 Hermes, again drawing on Stoic 
philosophy, also corroborated the idea that individual souls were instantia-
tions of  the World Soul. 2 All souls, he declared in Pimander, tract x, flowed 
from the World Soul, whirling around « as if  distributed » through the cos-
mos ; 3 and, later in the same tract, he noted that, before entering the body 
and becoming corrupted by passions, they « depended » on the World Soul. 4 
The disguised but formative role that Stoic philosophy played in Bruno’s in-
terpretation is exemplified in his comment that the Universal Intellect « im-
pregnated matter with every form ». 5 To bring out this idea, he noted that 
Plotinus had called the Universal Intellect « a father and generator » 6 and 
that the magi had described it as « most fecund with seeds ». 7 The magus 
that Bruno had in mind was almost certainly Hermes Trismegistos, who 
had spoken of  the cosmos as impregnated with seeds by the Mind or God. 8 
1 For Hermes, see M. Lapidge, The Stoic Inheritance, in A History of  Twelfth-Century Western 
Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke, Cambridge, 1988, p. 103. For Virgil, see T. Gregory, Anima mundi. 
La filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e la scuola di Chartres, Florence, 1955, p. 124 ; M. Lapidge, 
The Stoic Inheritance, cit., p. 105 ; M.A. Granada, Giordano Bruno et la Stoa, cit., pp. 143-144. St 
Jerome correctly observed that Virgil’s lines drew on Stoic philosophy ; see St Jerome, Com-
mentariorum in Isaiam prophetam libri duodeviginti, pl xxiv 558a-b  : « juxta Stoicos insignis poeta 
scribens, ait » ; P. Courcelle, Connais-toi toi-même, cit., ii, pp. 472-473. 
2 Chrysippus apud Diogenes Laertius, vii.87 (svf iii.4), vii.143 (svf ii.633) ; Diogenes 
Laertius, vii.157 (svf ii.774) ; Cleanthes, svf i.495 ; Zeno apud Cicero, De natura deorum, 
ii.8, 22 (svf i.33, §§112-113) ; Marcus Aurelius, ii.1, v.27, xii.26, xii.30 ; A.-J. Festugière and A. 
D. Nock, ch, i, p. 126, note 28 ; B. P. Copenhaver, Hermetica, cit., p. 158 ; G. Reydams-Schils, 
Demiurge and Providence, cit., pp. 59, 157.
3 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], x.7, ch i 116.7-9, trans. Ficino, fol. [32r] : « ab una mun-
di totius anima universae profluunt animae per omnem mundum, tanquam distributae cir-
cumcurrentes ». 
4 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], x.15, ch i 120.13-18, trans. Ficino, fol. [34r] : « Hoc 
inquam assero, animam pueri contemplari seipsam nondum ex natura sua propter corpus 
egressam, nondum enim corpus omnino compactum est, ac seipsam undique pulchram 
conspicere, nam haud corrupta est adhuc a corporis passionibus, mundi totius anima tunc-
que dependens ».
5 Causa, ii, oib i 653. Similarly, Sig. sigill., ii.10, bol ii,ii, 202, bomne ii 274.
6 Causa, ii, oib i 653. For Bruno’s sources, see T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw iii 345-
346. 7 Causa, ii, oib i 653. Similarly, Sig. sigill., ii.11, bol ii,ii 203, bomne ii 276.
8 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], ix.3, ix.6, xiv.10, ch i 97.7-12, 99.3, ii 226.3-8, trans. 
Ficino, fols [28]r : « Mens omnes notiones concipit, bonas quidem, quotiens a deo semen in-
funditur, contrarias autem, cum a demonibus quibusdam spermata iaciuntur. Nulla profecto 
mundi pars est demonum praesentia destituta, horum lumen ab ipso deo totum descendit. 
Demum denique transfusus in hominem, semina proprie orationis inspergit. Mens autem 
conspersa seminibus pregnans […] », [29r] : « semina », « instar agricultoris periti », [56v] : « Aspi-
ce, precor, agricultorem semina in terrae gremium diffundentem ». G. Aquilecchia in oib i 
653, note 29, and T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw iii 344-345, cite [Pimander], ix.6 (as above) 
as Bruno’s source. 
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The analogy derived, in both cases, Plotinus’s and Hermes’s, from the Stoic 
doctrine of  spermatiko;~ lovgo~. 1
Into this Hermetic and Pythagorean – or, as we would say, Stoic – frame-
work, Bruno introduced a doctrine of  great significance for his ontology. 
There were two inseparable substances in nature, an active power capable 
of  producing all things and a passive one correspondingly receptive of  being 
made into all things. The World Soul, together with its faculty, the Universal 
Intellect, the source of  all forms, was the active power ; universal matter was 
the passive power. Shaped by the World Soul, the latter assumed dimen-
sions, that is, body. Though devoid of  all qualities and hence imperceptible, 
matter was discernible by reason. Since, then, it was an object of  thought, 
it existed. It was not, that is, the prope nihil of  Aristotelian philosophy but 
instead, no less than the World Soul, a ‘substance’. Both the World Soul and 
universal matter were eternal. Indeed they were the only eternal things of  
nature. All else, including individual souls, was accidental. 2
These ideas, as Émile Namer pointed out, are Stoic. 3 Diogenes Laertius, 
ps. Plutarch (in the Placita philosophorum attributed in Bruno’s day to Plutar-
ch), Cicero, Seneca and others reported that Stoics posited two principles, 
an active ajrch; poihtikhv and a passive ajrch; paqhrikhv. Both were eternal, 
ungenerated and, apart perhaps from the moment of  universal conflagra-
tion, inseparable. From their union derived the elements and hence all other 
things. 4 The active principle – variously identified, according to context, as 
the Demiurge, World Soul, Mind, God, Zeus, Fate, reason (lovgo~, ratio) or 
cause (causa) – moved and endowed form to the passive principle, which was 
interpreted as unqualified substance (oujsiva) or ‘first matter’ (prwvth u{lh). 5 
1 A.-J. Festugière and A. D. Nock, in ch i 104, note 25 ; G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge 
and Providence, cit., pp. 46, 71-72, 82, 147 ; Diogenes Laertius, vii.136 (svf i.102, ii.580) ; M. 
J. White, Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology), in The Cambridge Companion to the 
Stoics, ed. B. Inwood, Cambridge, 2003, p. 137.
2 Causa, ii, iii, oib i 655-656, 663-665, 678-688 ; De monade, ii, bol i,ii 344-345. Bruno alludes 
to this doctrine elsewhere ; e.g. Cena, i, v, oib i 443, 555-557 ; Spaccio, epist., oib ii 181-182. For 
discussion of  it, see F. Tocco, Le opere latine, cit., p. 346 ; É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 
28, 31-32, 40, 52, 61-64, 70, 75, 80-81, 87-91, 99-100, 112.
3 É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 52, 63-64, 70, 87-91. See also G. Aquilecchia in 
boeuc iii, 325 note 35 ; T. Dagron, Unité de l’être et dialectique, cit., p. 242 note 5.
4 E.g. Diogenes Laertius, vii.134 (svf i.85, 493 ; ii.300 ; iii Archidemus 12), vii.150 (svf i.87, 
ii.316) ; ps. Plutarch, Placita philosophorum, i.3, 878b-c, ed. Mau, p. 59.17-20 (svf i.85) ; Sextus 
Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos, ix.11, ed. Mutschmann, p. 215.15-17 (svf ii.301) ; Cicero, 
Academica posteriora, vi.24, vii.27-29, ed. Plasberg, pp. 10-13 (reporting Antiochus of  Ascalon’s 
views) ; Seneca, Epistulae morales, lxv.2 (svf ii.303).
5 For the two principles in Stoic philosophy, see É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 88-
91 ; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, 2 vols, 4th ed., Göttingen, 1970-
72, i, pp. 67-69, ii, p. 38 ; D. E. Hahm, The Origins of  Stoic Cosmology, cit., pp. 29-56 ; R. B. Todd, 
Monism and Immanence : Foundations of  Stoic Physics, in J. M. Rist, The Stoics, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1978, pp. 137-160 ; G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, cit., pp. 42-60, 
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Aristotelian doctrines of  principles, change and matter, particularly Aristo-
telian accounts of  biological genesis, are evident influences, as is Aristotle’s 
identification of  God with nou`~. The Stoics, however, reinterpreted these 
ideas. Two of  their innovations are significant for Bruno cosmology. First, 
the Stoic active principle – the World Soul, with Mind as one of  its aspects 
– was self-moving and immanent throughout the cosmos, whereas Aristo-
tle’s nou`~, as pure Intellect without psychic functions, imparted movement 
from outside the cosmos and solely to the primum mobile. Second, whereas 
for Aristotle, matter was the substrate of  individual instances of  sublunary 
change, for Stoics, it was the substrate of  the cosmos as a whole, an inter-
pretation inspired perhaps by the « receptacle of  all becoming » described 
in Plato’s Timaeus. 1 Bruno mentioned Plato’s receptacle in his account of  
the two principles. 2 In several other respects, most noticeably in his ideas 
concerning aether, spiritus (understood as a subtle body rather than as soul) 
and comets, Bruno showed an interest in, or affinity with, Stoic cosmology. 3 
Perhaps, like his near contemporary Francesco Patrizi, he recognized that 
Stoicism had adhered closely to Hermes Trismegistos’s physics. 4
Bruno, however, shied away from an important feature of  Stoic ontology. 
For Stoics, both principles, even the active when conceived as the World 
Soul or God, were corporeal. 5 Cleanthes, for example, had called the World 
Soul fiery and intelligent ; Chrysippus defined pneuma as a mixture of  air and 
fire. 6 In the third dialogue of  De la causa, Bruno explicitly rejected Stoic cor-
89-100, 115, and passim ; M. J. White, Stoic Natural Philosophy, cit., pp. 125-126, 129, 132-133, 136 ; 
B. Inwood in L. A. Seneca, Seneca. Selected Philosophical Letters, trans and comm. B. Inwood, 
Oxford, 2007, pp. 138-139, 155.
1 Plato, Timaeus, 48e-52d  ; D. E. Hahm, The Origins of  Stoic Cosmology, cit., pp. 39-40, 46-
48 ; G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, cit., pp. 28-32, 43-45.
2 Causa, iii, oib i 686.
3 M.A. Granada, Giordano Bruno et la Stoa, cit., pp. 143-144, 147-160.
4 F. Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, with other works and translations by Patrizi, 6 
pts, Ferrara, 1591, pt 4, fol. 3rb : « Apparebit, quoque, Graecas philosophias omnes, Pythagore-
am, Platonicam in divinis, ac morum dogmatibus Aristotelicam autem, et Stoicam in physi-
cis, et medicinae etiam prima principia, et ex his, et ex aliis, qui perierunt eius [i.e. of  Hermes] 
libris fuisse desumptas ».
5 M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, cit., i, pp. 67-69 ; D.E. Hahm, The Origins of  Stoic Cosmology, cit., 
pp. 4, 9, 14, 32, 37, 49 note 12 ; G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, cit., pp. 56-60, 68, 
89-101, 108, 115, 224 ; M.J. White, Stoic Natural Philolosophy, cit., pp. 128-133, 136. A minority of  
modern scholars reject this otherwise universally accepted interpretation, arguing that the 
Stoic active principle was, in fact, incorporeal ; see e.g. R.B. Todd, Monism and Immanence, cit. 
G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence, cit., pp. 56-60, discusses the conflicting modern 
scholarly views. 
6 T. Gregory, Anima mundi, cit., p. 124 ; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, cit., i, pp. 67-68 ; M. Lap-
idge, Archai and Stoicheia, cit., pp. 240-278, especially pp. 247, 253-258, 263-275 ; Idem, Stoic Cos-
mology, cit., pp. 164, 168-176 ; A. A. Long, Soul and Body in Stoicism, « Phronesis », xxvii, 1982, pp. 
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porealism. For many years, reacting against Aristotle’s hylomorphism, he 
tells us, he had held that « forms were nothing other than accidental disposi-
tions of  matter », as Democritus, the Epicureans, Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), 
Cyreniacs, Cynics and Stoics had proposed. 1 With time, however, he had 
come to recognize, that there were (as we have seen above) necessarily two 
substances, active form (the World Soul) and passive matter. 2 How this con-
clusion squared with Bruno’s proposition, articulated in the remainder of  
De la causa, that these two substances were ultimately two aspects of  the one 
supra-substantial God is beyond the scope of  this essay. 3 For his immediate 
purpose in the second dialogue, namely, explaining in what sense the World 
Soul was or was not immanent, what mattered was that he retained the no-
tion of  intelligible realities of  the kind proposed in Platonic philosophy. Ad-
justments, of  course, needed to be made. To say, as Plato did of  the Ideas, that 
intelligible realities were completely disengaged from matter was fantastic. 4 
But this did not mean that they were fictions. They existed, distinct from 
matter, but necessarily engaged with it. Hence Bruno could call the Ideas 
‘separate, absolute, substances’. 5 Again, the Intellect was « separate » from us 
but not completely so, as Platonists claimed when they observed that it did 
not « stoop to us », leaving us to gaze upon it on high. The Intellect manifest-
ly did engage with us, illuminating us perpetually. 6 Intelligible realities, in 
other words, retained their own identity as separate substances in combina-
tion with matter but did not exist separately from it. The World Soul, Bruno 
wrote in the Lampas triginta statuarum, spread through all things without 
mixing with it, just as light was diffused in air without becoming consub-
stantial with it. 7 Similar sentiments occur throughout his surviving works.
Observations of  this kind showed that the World Soul was, as Bruno 
wrote in the prefatory letter of  De la causa, « esteriore » as well as « intima » in 
natural things. 8 Together with its faculty the Universal Intellect, it was in-
ternal to the universe inasmuch as it worked from within rather than from 
outside of  it. It was external to the universe in that it was a distinct substance 
which did not perish with the individual things it produced in combination 
34-57 ; D. E. Hahm, The Origins of  Stoic Cosmology, cit., pp. 139-153, 158-162 ; M. J. White, Stoic 
Natural Philosophy, cit., p. 129, 133-136 ; T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw iii 387. 
1 Causa, iii, oib i 678 : « le forme non essere altro che certe accidentali dispososizioni de la 
materia ». See further É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 31, 99-100, 111.
2 Causa, iii, boi i 678-679. For the World Soul as ‘form’, see Causa, ii-iii, oib i 651, 658, 662-
669, 684-686.
3 See, e.g. Causa, iii, oib i, 696-698 ; É. Namer, Les Aspects de Dieu, cit., pp. 32, 43, 76, 93, 100-
101, 112, 122-123, 144-147. 4 Causa, iv, oib i 721 ; De immenso, viii.10, bol i,ii 313. 
5 Orat. valed., bol i,i 16. 
6 Sig. sigill., i.31, bol ii, ii 173, bomne ii 210 ; P.-H. Michel, La Cosmologie, cit., p. 115 (The 
Cosmology, cit., p. 110). 7 Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 6, 183, bom 1052, 1316. 
8 Causa, ii, oib i 598.
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with matter. 1 This was, Bruno explained in the Lampas triginta statuarum, 
how philosophers should be understood when they called the Intellect 
‘separate’. 2 Numerous authorities corroborated this position. Orpheus had 
called the Universal Intellect « the World’s eye », a phrase indicating that the 
Universal Intellect saw both within and outside all natural things, that it 
worked both intrinsically and extrinsically to maintain the overall harmony 
of  the universe. 3 Plato – that is, the Pythagorean Timaeus of  Plato’s dia-
logue (see pp. 467-468 above) – had spoken of  the World Soul as not only 
spreading from the centre throughout the cosmos, but also enveloping it 
from without. 4 With this passage in mind, Plotinus, as Bruno observed in 
De la causa, dialogue ii, had commented that it was more appropriate to 
speak of  the body being in the soul rather than vice versa. 5 Once again, Bru-
no’s position conformed with that of  Hermes Trismegistos. The Soul, with 
Mind and God within, Hermes declared, was both intrinsic and extrinsic – 
intrinsecus and extrinsecus in Ficino’s translation – to the physical cosmos. 6
Principles and Causes
To speak, as Stoic philosophy did, of  one subtle bodily thing (the active prin-
ciple) as diffused within another, denser, body (the passive principle) made 
some sense. Applied to intelligible realities, however, the language of  imma-
nence can only be metaphorical. Bruno recognized this. As he pointed out 
in De la causa, dialogue ii and elsewhere, by definition souls and intelligible 
realities in general had no dimensions and therefore could not be inside or 
outside anything. 7 The analogy drawn between the distribution of  sound 
1 Causa, ii, boi i 664-665 ; Spaccio, epist., oib ii 181-182 ; F. Tocco, Le opere inedite, cit., pp. 
57-61. 2 Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 48 ; bom 1034.
3 Causa, ii, oib i 653 : « occhio del mondo ». For sources, see T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., 
in bw iii 345. See also Causa, iii, oib i 690-691.
4 Plato, Timaeus, 34b1-5, 36e2-3, trans. Ficino, cit., sigs et4vb-5ra : « Animam autem in eius 
medio collocavit, perque totum tendit, atque ea corpus ipsum etiam extrinsecus circumte-
xit », sig. et5va : « At illa a medio per omne usque ad celi extrema se porrigens, eique extrinse-
cus circunfusa seque in seipsa convertens ». See also, e.g., Timaeus of Locri, De natura mundi 
et animae, ed. and German trans. W. Marg, Leiden, 1972, p. 124 (95e). Bruno associated this 
idea with Pythagoras in Causa, proemiale epistola, oib i 599 : « E si conchiude con Pitagora et 
altri che non in vano hanno aperti gli occhi, come un spirito immenso secondo diverse rag-
gioni et ordini, colma e contiene il tutto ».
5 Causa, ii, oib i 662-663 ; Furori, i.3, oib ii 566 ; Plotinus, iv.3.201-51, iv.3.227-12, citing Pla-
to, Timaeus, 36d9-37c2  ; E. Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, cit., p. 176. 
6 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], xi.4, ch i 148.23-149.2, trans. Ficino, fol. [38r], quoted 
above at p. 470, note 7. See also Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], xii.23, ch i 183.14-15, 
trans. Ficino, fol. [49r].
7 Causa, ii, iii, oib i 669, 681 : « la natura opra dal centro (per dir cossì) del suo soggetto o 
materia ». Similarly, Furori, i.3, oib ii 566 ; Thes. de magia, ix, xi, bol iii 460-461, 463-464, bom 
334-336, 340-342.
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and that of  the soul, he wrote, mindful of  Plotinus’s own qualifications 
about its appropriateness, was « rozzo ». 1 Hermes Trismegistos, we may add, 
had declared that there was nothing dimensional about intelligible beings. 2
To forestall this objection, Bruno redefined spatial expressions such as 
‘within’ and ‘without’, ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’, ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ in 
terms of  causality. To this end, he adapted a Neoplatonic distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic causes developed by Arabic and subsequently Latin au-
thors, including Marsilio Ficino in some early writings unavailable in print 
in Bruno’s day. 3 Interestingly, the Neoplatonic and Arabic thinkers in ques-
tion had developed this distinction with the issue of  immanence and tran-
scendence in mind . Bruno probably knew the brief  remarks in Averroes’s 
Metaphysics commentary. 4 His immediate source was, however, a passage in 
Thomas Aquinas’s De principiis naturae (‘On the Principles of  Nature’), com-
posed c. 1255, or perhaps an intermediary. 5 The generation of  natural things, 
Thomas explained, following standard Aristotelian and scholastic doctrine, 
required a final and an efficient cause as well as a material and a formal 
1 Causa, ii, boi i 669 ; Plotinus, vi.4.1228-29.
2 Hermes Trismegistos, [Pimander], iv.1, xii.8, xii.23, xiii.3, ch, i 49.6-7, 177.9-10, 183.12-
14, ii, 201.19, trans. Ficino, fols [16v], [45r] : « nihil est intelligibilium ab intelligibili distans », 
[49v], [50r].
3 R. Wisnovsky, Final and Efficient Causality in Avicenna’s Cosmology and Theology, « Quaes-
tio : Yearbook of  the History of  Metaphysics », ii, 2002, pp. 97-123 ; Idem, Towards a History of  
Avicenna’s Distinction Between Immanent and Transcendant Causes, in D. C. Reisman and A.H. 
Al-Rahim (eds), Before and After Avicenna, Leiden, 2003, pp. 49-68, esp. pp. 49-50, 60-67 (with 
English translations of  Avicenna’s distinctions between the two sets of  causes on pp. 62-66) ; 
Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina V-x, ed. S. van Riet, Louvain, 1980, p. 
292.27-36 ; Avicenna, Sufficientia, cap. xi, a-c, ‘De comparationibus causarum inter se’, in 
Idem, Opera, trans. Gundissalinus, Venice, 1508, fol. 19va-vb ; P.O. Kristeller, The Scholastic 
Background of  Marsilio Ficino, with an Edition of  Unpublished Texts, « Traditio », ii, 1944, p. 293 
(cited by T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw, iii, p. 339).
4 Averroes, In libros Metaphysicorum, v.1, in Aristotle and Averroes, Opera … omnia, 11 
vols, Venice, 1562, viii, fol. 101f : « omnes enim causae non sunt principia, nisi propter istud 
primum [principium]. Deinde dicit : Et quaedam principia sunt in rebus, etc. [Aristotle, Meta-
physics, Δ.1, 1013a19-20] : id est principiorum quaedam sunt in re, verbi gratia, ut forma et 
materia, et quaedam extra rem, ut agens et finis » ; Averroes, In libros Metaphysicorum, v.4, 
fol. 105f-g  : « Vult [Aristoteles, Metaphysics, Δ.3, 1014a26-b15] distinguere secundum quot modos 
dicitur elementum, quum ista nomina sunt propinqua synonymis et communibus appropria-
tis. Elementum enim non dicitur de causis extrinsecis, et dicitur de intrinsecis et dignius de 
materia. Principium autem dignius est dici de causis extrinsecis et causa est minor principio 
in hoc. Principium autem est quasi universalius causa, cum dicatur principium de principiis 
transmutationis et de quatuor causis ». Wisnovksy does not mention Averroes’s distinction in 
his two studies.
5 For Thomas’s De principiis naturae, see J. Bobik, Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Ele-
ments. A Translation and Interpretation of  the De principiis naturae and the De mixtione elemen-
torum of  St. Thomas Aquinas, Notre Dame, 1998. Thomas’s probable source, as yet unidenti-
fied is, I believe, Avicenna, Liber de philosophia, p. 292.27-36, cited in note 3 above. 
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one. 1 These four causes could be divided into two principles and two causes. 
A knife was constituted of  matter and form. Hence, material and formal 
causes were intrinsic. Final and efficient causes, on the other hand, were ex-
trinsic. The final cause of  the knife, to cut things, and its efficient cause, the 
knife maker, were not constituents of  the knife. All four causes were com-
monly called causes, noted Thomas, but properly speaking the two intrinsic 
causes, the material and formal, were principles, whereas the two external 
causes, the final and efficient causes, were authentic causes. Bruno made the 
same point. Given that this terminology does not occur in the Greek or Ara-
bic sources, we can be reasonably sure that Thomas’s discussion or a deriva-
tive was Bruno’s source for the doctrine as a whole. 2 The distinction between 
the two types of  cause corresponded to the scholastic distinction, mentioned 
by Bruno in other contexts, between the cause whereby something comes 
into being (causa fiendi) and the cause of  its actual existence (causa essendi). 3
Bruno applied Thomas’s distinction to matter, the World Soul and the 
latter’s faculty, the Universal Intellect. 4 Matter and the World Soul were, 
respectively, the intrinsic material and formal causes or rather principles 
constituting the physical universe. 5 The Universal Intellect was the efficient 
cause of  the universe. 6 As an efficient cause, it was external to its effects and 
so, properly speaking, a cause rather than a principle. 7 It was, however, the 
most intimate faculty of  the World Soul, shaping things from within and 
therefore could be said to be « intimate » as well as « exterior » to « natural 
things ». 8 The World Soul – the formal principle – and Universal Intellect – 
the efficient cause – were, that is, ‘joined’ and ‘in a certain way’ one and the 
same. 9 Lastly, the World Soul conjoined with the Universal Intellect gov-
erned the universe in accordance with a final cause, « the perfection of  the 
universe ». By doing so, it ensured that, at any given moment, the matter of  
which the universe was constituted fulfilled all its potentialities. 10 It ensured, 
that is, that the universe was « in act ». 11
 1 Thomas Aquinas, De principiis naturae, cap. 3, tol xliii 41-43. Thomas mentions the 
same distinction briefly in De veritate, qu. 14, art. 5, arg. 2.
 2 Causa, ii, boi i 650-651.
 3 Summa term. met., vi, bol i,iv 19 ; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, i, qu. 104, art. 1, 
con., tol v 464. 
 4 Causa, ii, oib i 650-651, 654-656 ; F. Fiorentino, Il panteismo, cit. pp. 55-57. Bruno defined 
causes and principles differerently elsewhere, distinguishing both from elements ; see Libri 
phys. expl., bol iii 266-267, 316.
 5 Causa, ii, oib i 651, 663-664. For the World Soul as the ‘principio formale’ of  the universe, 
see also Causa, proemiale epistola, ii-iii, oib i 599, 663, 664, 679, 685.
 6 Causa, epist., ii, oib i 599, 651-656. 7 Causa, ii oib i 654-655.
 8 Causa, epist., boi i 598. Cfr. De rerum princ., bol iii 509, bom 586 : « Rerum causae efficien-
tes et moventes sunt intellectus et anima ». 9 Causa, epist., ii, boi i 651, 655-656.
10 Causa, ii, oib i 655. Similarly Cena, v, oib i, 555-557.
11 For the universe as ‘in act’ when fulfilling all its potentialities, see, e.g., Causa, proemiale 
epistola, i-iiii, oib i 603, 655, 698.
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The Intellect achieved this end by means of  the Ideas of  which it was 
constituted. Like a sculptor, it modelled its effects on the Ideas, understood 
as archetypes, and expressed them as principles intrinsic to things. 1 It per-
formed, therefore, two roles, extrinsic cause and intrinsic principle. To il-
lustrate this point, Bruno borrowed, no doubt with a certain impish glee, 
Aristotle’s notoriously controversial comments on the separability of  the 
intellectual soul in De anima, ii.2. Aristotle had described the soul at one 
moment as the form of  the body and therefore inseparable from it but, 
at another, had commented (following Bruno’s interpretation) that, as a 
knowing subject, it was separate from matter and therefore a subsistent 
substance. 2 What was true of  the human soul was a fortiori true of  the Uni-
versal Intellect conjoined with the World Soul, given that, as Plotinus had 
pointed out, the World Soul ruled its body, the cosmos, more simply than 
human souls governed theirs. 3 The World Soul conjoined with the Univer-
sal Intellect was, to adapt an analogy used by Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and 
countless other thinkers over the centuries, like a helmsman on board a 
ship. 4 Inasmuch as he moved with his ship, a helmsman was part of  it. Inas-
much as he governed its direction autonomously, he was separate from it. 5 
Similarly, the Universal Intellect conjoined with the World Soul was both a 
principle, inasmuch as it was the form and therefore ‘part’ of  natural things, 
and a cause, inasmuch as it was the extrinsic cause of  their activity.
The distinction between principle and cause applied also to God, with an 
important qualification. The terms ‘cause’ and ‘principle’ when used of  the 
Universal Intellect and the World Soul denoted the distinct ways – extrinsic 
and intrinsic – in which they related to their effects. By definition, however, 
God was absolutely simple, singular and suprasubstantial. 6 No distinctions 
or enumerations were admissible in him. Hence God, uniquely, was both 
cause and principle of  each and every thing and the two terms denoted 
no more than the two ways in which they related to him. 7 He was their 
1 Causa, ii, oib i 655. 2 Causa, ii, oib i 656.
3 Causa, ii, oib i 656-657 ; Plotinus ii.9.7 ; T. Leinkauf, Kommentar, cit., in bw iii 356.
4 For the analogy, see Canone, Il dorso e il grembo, pp. 7, 54, 65, 242-243.
5 Causa ii, oib i 656.
6 Causa ii, oib i 648. Similarly De rerum princ., bol iii 509, bom 586 ; Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 
40, bom 1014 ; Summa term. met., bol i, iv, pp. 73-74.
7 Causa ii, oib i 650. As noted by E. Canone, Magia dei contrari, cit., p. 16, note 1, Bruno 
(Summa term. met., ‘Intellectus seu idea’, bol i,iv 102-104), using the traditional analogy of  
the sun and sunlight, which he attributed to the Egyptians and Platonists, commented that 
God could be spoken of  in two ways, in His absolute simplicity and vestigially as the « pater 
generationis ». The sun’s instrinsic substance, while remaining unchanged in itself, produced 
light and warmth, thereby generating and sustaining life. Its substance was therefore triadic, 
in that the light and warmth that it produced were rooted (radicatus) in it. Similarly, God was 
triadic : His absolute simplicity was threefold in that His substance entailed the generative
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efficient cause and hence external to them ; but he was also their intrinsic 
principle inasmuch as each thing occupied a place within the hierarchically 
ordered whole deriving from him. 1 (An analogy, which Bruno did not pro-
vide, might be the way in which an axiom is implicit in a hierarchy of  axi-
oms deriving from it.) Bruno’s comment that priority and posteriority in 
this hierarchy was based on ‘duration’, ‘nature’, or ‘dignity’ – that is, tem-
poral priority, ontological priority and priority of  one thing over another 
of  the same kind based on merit or rank – derived from scholastic discus-
sions of  priority, or rather the lack of  it, in relation to the three persons of  
the Trinity, 2 a subject that had preoccupied Bruno during his early career 
as a theologian. Ultimately, the distinctions between these types of  prior-
ity derived from Aristotle’s Categories. 3 Bruno did not re-employ this argu-
ment, not an entirely satisfactory one, on the other occasions on which he 
explained that God was both above and within things. 4
Conclusion
In the second dialogue of  De la causa, Bruno set himself  the task of  explain-
ing that the World Soul was both immanent and extrinsic to the universe. 
Following Stoic sources, ones that he mistakenly believed to be Egyptian 
or Pythagorean, he described the World Soul as lying ‘within’ the material 
world. The Universal Intellect was an aspect or, in his words, ‘faculty’ of  
the World Soul rather than a distinct hypostasis of  the kind that Neopla-
tonists had posited. The Universal Intellect and the Ideas of  which it was 
comprised were, therefore, also immanent within the universe. Further, 
power which produced the rational order of  all things (intelligentia) and the love (amor seu 
pulchritudo) binding all things to Him.
1 Causa, ii, oib i 650. Bruno mentioned or discussed order (ordo) in relation to Deus seu 
mens in Immenso, v. 10, bol i,ii 314, and Summa term. met., xxix, bol i,iv 86-87. In the next two 
sections of  the latter work (ibidem, xxx-xxxi, bol i,iv, 87), he discussed priority and posteri-
ority.
2 Thomas Aquinas, Contra errores graecorum, pars 1, cap. 2 (tol xl, a, 73) ; Idem, In senten-
tiis, lib. 1, dist. 9, qu. 2, art. 1, co. ; ibidem, lib. 1, dist. 12, qu. 1, pr. ; Idem, De potentia, qu. 3, art. 
18 ad 17 ; ps. Thomas Aquinas (Nicolaus de Gorran), In vii epistolas canonicas, pars 4, cap. 
1, in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia, 25 vols, Parma, 1852-72, xxxi, p. 422. (All available online 
through the Corpus thomisticum).
3 Aristotle, Categories, xii, 14a26-b8 ; Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor, lib. 
4, pl lxiv 283d-286c.
4 E.g., Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 40, bom 1014 : « Est supra omnia, infra omnia, in omnibus » ; 
De minimo, i.4, bol i, iii 147 ; Summa term. met., bol i,iv, 102 ; Firpo, Le Procès, cit., pp. 67, 303. 
Elsewhere, as F. Tocco (Le opere inedite, cit., p. 47) noted, Bruno described God as intrinsic 
in things, more so than things were in themselves, a formula that he used elsewhere of  the 
World Soul ; cf. Lampas trig. stat., bol iii 41, bom 1016 ; and Causa, proemiale epistola, oib i 
606. In Sig. sigill., i.32, bol ii, ii 175, bomne ii 214, Bruno used the formula of  the (Universal) 
Intellect.
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from Stoic philosophy, though on this occasion knowingly, Bruno borrowed 
the idea that the World Soul was the active principle informing the passive 
principle of  matter to produce the corporeal universe. Unlike the Stoics, 
however, Bruno defined the World Soul, the Universal Intellect and its con-
stituent Ideas as intelligible realities. This permitted him to argue that they 
were ‘separate’ and therefore ‘exterior’ or ‘extrinsic’ to, as well as immanent 
within, the corporeal world.
Bruno was, however, aware that words and expressions denoting spatial 
relationships were inadequate for the task to hand. Intelligible realities, be-
ing by definition dimensionless, could not be located in or outside corpo-
real things. To solve the problem, he redefined interiority and exteriority in 
terms of  causality. Drawing on a passage in Thomas Aquinas’s De principiis 
naturae or a derivative, he defined principles as internal causes and distin-
guished them from causes proper, which were external. He applied this dis-
tinction to the World Soul and the Universal Intellect with its constituent 
Ideas, and indeed, albeit briefly, to God. With these concepts and definitions 
in place, Bruno proceeded to his extraordinary account of  matter, God and 
the universe in the following dialogues of  De la causa, principio et uno.
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